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The economics of oil, biofuel and food commodities
Abstract
We study the effects on the food market of the introduction of biofuels as a substitute for fossil
fuel in the energy market. We consider a world economy with an oil cartel and a competitive
fringe of farmers producing energy in the form of biofuels. Farmers also produce food and sell it
on the world food market. We determine the resulting relationship between prices in the energy
and food markets and characterize the cartel’s extraction path and the price path of energy.
We show that the price of food will be growing as long the oil stock is being depleted, whether
population is growing or not, and that it will keep growing after the oil stock is exhausted if
population is growing. An analysis of the effects of the productivity of land use in either the
food or the biofuel sectors is carried out.
Keywords: Biofuel; Oil depletion; Population growth; Energy price; Food price
Re´sume´
Nous e´tudions l’effet sur le marche´ des aliments de l’introduction sur le marche´ de l’e´nergie
de biocarburants, comme substitut aux combustibles fossiles. Nous supposons une e´conomie ou`
cohabitent sur le marche´ de l’e´nergie un cartel pe´trolier et une frange compe´titive de cultivateurs
qui produit de l’e´nergie sous forme de biocarburant. Les cultivateurs produisent e´galement des
produits agricoles qu’ils vendent sur le marche´ des aliments. Nous caracte´risons la relation qui
en re´sulte entre le prix de l’e´nergie et le prix des aliments, ainsi que le sentier d’extraction du
cartel pe´trolier et le sentier de prix de l’e´nergie. Il est de´montre´ que le prix des aliments va
croˆıtre aussi longtemps que le stock de pe´trole n’est pas e´puise´, et cela que la population soit
croissante ou non. Il continuera a` croˆıtre une fois le stock de pe´trole e´puise´ si la population
est croissante. Les effets de l’ame´lioration dans la productivite´ de la terre dans la production
d’aliments ainsi que dans la production de biocarburant sont analyse´s.
Mots-cle´s : Biocarburant ; E´puisement du pe´trole ; Croissance de la population ; Prix de l’e´nergie ;
Prix des aliments.
1 Introduction
The recent food crisis has become a major concern for world leaders. In June 2008, the
World Food Summit organized by the United Nations that took place in Rome raised many
questions about the causes of this crisis and what to do about it. Indeed, since the year
2000, major food crop prices have increased for the first time since the 1970s. The prices of
corn, rice, wheat as well as other crops reached record highs. According to a recent article
by the Economist magazine,1 food accounts in Botswana and South Africa for a fifth of the
consumer price index; in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh it accounts for two-thirds. This might
explain the violent clashes that took place in several developing countries (Haiti, Cameroon
and Egypt, among others) in the wake of the sharp increase in crop prices that occurred in
2007 and 2008.
Against this backdrop, a number of explanations for this crisis have been proposed. First,
a line of argument attributes the increase in major crop prices to the rising world demand
for food, which has not been followed by adequate investments in the agricultural sector.
The proponents of this view, namely the UN secretary general, declared that global food
output must increase by 50% by 2030 in order to maintain ‘food security’. However, such
an argument suffers from a drawback. While the lack of investments in agriculture has been
a long-term structural problem ever since the end of the ‘first green revolution’ of the 1960s
and 70s, it is the case that the recent rise in crop prices has been sharp and dramatic. An
alternative view considers that the recent development of the biofuel industry has a lot to
do with the food crisis. Advocates of this view include a number of specialized NGOs and
renowned international research organizations, like the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI). According to the IFPRI, biofuels account for up to 30% of the increase
in the price of agricultural commodities.
From 1999 until the summer of 2008, both global energy demand and fossil fuels prices
1From The Economist print edition, June 5, 2008, page 70.
have been steadily rising.2 This has caused pressure for the development of biofuels as an
alternative source of energy.3 This was not the case during the 1990s, when the fossil fuel
price was too low to allow for the economic viability of this renewable resource. This increase
in the demand for biofuels has generated a ‘crowding-out effect’ in the agricultural sector.
Many argue that scarce agricultural resources are being diverted away from food production
towards the production of biofuels, which results in a reduction in global crop supplies.
The fact that the prices of oil and food commodities have both tumbled during a period
of time following the last quarter of 2008 also suggests that, during the current decade,
both prices have become highly positively correlated. In this paper we investigate, within
a reasonably tractable model, the mechanisms through which these two markets are linked
and how the development of the biofuel industry has affected the correlation between energy
and food prices. The model also allows us to look at the possible impacts on food and energy
prices of improving land use in either food or biofuel production. As we will show, those
impacts are complex and difficult to predict without some careful empirical analyses.
Since the questions arising from the introduction of biofuels are relatively recent, the
economic literature on this subject is limited. Moreover, as pointed out by Rajagopal and
Zilberman (2007) in a World Bank policy survey, “the environmental literature is dominated
by a discussion of net carbon offset and net energy gain, while indicators relating to impact
on human health, soil quality, biodiversity, water depletion, etc., have received much less at-
tention”.4 Chakravorty, Hubert and Nostbakken (2009) point out that most of the literature
focuses on life cycle assessment of biofuels, with the main conclusion being that they are not
carbon neutral. There is also a small literature on ’food versus fuel’ where the price of oil is
2China and India’s staggering growth rates account for a large chunk of that.
3Not to mention environmental lobbying and political pressures that have led to an additional regulation
induced demand. For instance, in 2010, the government of Canada imposed a mandatory 5% biofuel content
in each liter of gasoline sold in the local market.
4See Rajagopal and Zilberman (2007), page 2. They also point out that serious concerns about the
carbon benefits of current biofuels can be raised, namely the fact that biofuels consume a significant amount
of energy that is derived from fossil fuels. See as well Giampietro, Ulgiati and Pimentel (1997), Lal (2004),
Pimentel and Patzek (2005), Farrell et al. (2006).
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exogenous.5 For instance, Hochman, Sexton and Zilberman (2008) study the crowding-out
effect of biofuels on the agricultural sector. They propose a two-country general equilibrium
trade model with energy as intermediate input. In their model, they consider two sources of
energy (fossil and biofuel); both the biofuel and food sectors compete for land and labor.6
Their main results suggest that trade liberalization tends to increase the demand for en-
ergy, which decreases food production and causes losses in forests and other non-agricultural
lands. They also show that neutral technical change in agricultural production, such as
biotechnology and second generation biofuel technologies, mitigates this pressure on land.
Hubert et al. (2008) deal with a related question. They find that backstop technologies will
be adopted earlier than expected in response to high increases in food and petroleum prices.
They also argue that, as a result, either the demand for energy will decrease or petroleum
will be replaced by backstop technologies. Chakravorty et al. (2010), for their part, carry
out a comprehensive empirical analysis of the long-run effects on food prices of United States
and European Union mandatory biofuel mandates, taking into account regional heterogene-
ity in land quality, consumer preferences and population growth. One of their conclusion
is that fears of a large-scale shift from food to biofuel production and its subsequent effect
on food prices may be exaggerated. The issue of competition between land and food has
also been examined in the agricultural economics literature in the context of an exogenous
change in the price of ethanol. Andrade de Sa, Palmer and Engel (2010) study the direct
and indirect impacts of ethanol production on land use, deforestation and food production.
One of their main results is that land competition between rival uses increases deforestation
and decreases food production. Feng and Babcock (2008) examine the effect of the develop-
ment of ethanol on different types of crops. Closer to our model, Chakravorty et al. (2008)
5Chakravorty, Hubert and Nostbakken (2009) conclude that ”most of them focus on the economics of
biofuels supply and in particular address the issue of government policy and how that can affect biofuels
production. A smaller sample of the models explicitly considers environmental impacts from biofuels pro-
duction. A fewer number explicitly consider the role of fossil fuel scarcity and the effect rising prices of
energy may have on the supply of biofuels”.
6In this paper, for simplicity, we consider that only the land resource is shared between food and energy
productions. As a matter of fact, many resources are subject to trade-off between these two sectors. See for
instance Gaudet, Moreaux and Withagen (2006), where water is shared between oil and agriculture.
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propose a centralized Ricardian-Hotelling model with land allocation decisions being decided
by a central planner. In their model, as the exhaustible resource becomes scarcer its price
increases, thereby making biofuels competitive. As a consequence, land shifts out from food
to energy production, which leads to an increase in the price of food. The demand for clean
energy is modeled by introducing an exogenous cap on the carbon stock in the atmosphere,
which leads to a rise in energy prices and speeds up the adoption of biofuels as a backstop.
In the present paper, unlike Hochman et al. (2008) and following Hubert et al. (2008)
and Chakravorty et al. (2008), we study the effects of nonrenewable resource exhaustion
over time as the impetus behind the rising global demand for biofuels, which might have a
perverse effect on ‘food security’. We propose a decentralized partial equilibrium model with
resource dynamics and we consider that the finite land resource is put into two alternative
uses by price-taking farmers: food and biofuel production. We abstract from the issue of
global atmospheric pollution caused by emissions. We model the effects of oil exhaustion on
the supply of biofuels and we study the effects of increased production of biofuel. Finally,
our model accounts for population growth and the effect this has on both oil extraction and
on ‘food security’. This allows us to distinguish the effect of population growth from that of
land use on the price of food. Our main focus is to model the relationship between energy and
food prices which follows from the depletion of fossil fuel (oil for short) and the development
of biofuels as a substitute. Unlike the papers mentioned earlier, we consider a dynamic
framework where the price paths for both energy and food are determined endogenously.
Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3 we solve the farmers’ land allocation problem.
Section 4 is devoted to the oil cartel’s optimal depletion and pricing decisions. Section 5
is devoted to an analysis of the effect on food end energy prices of land productivity. We
conclude in Section 6.
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2 The model
Consider an economy composed of an agricultural sector and an oil sector and of two markets,
one for energy and one for food. The energy market is supplied by farmers, in the form of
biofuel, and by an oil cartel. The market for food is supplied by price-taking farmers.
2.1 The supply sides
The cartel, acting as a dominant firm, extracts fossil fuel and sells it on the energy market.
The finite stock of nonrenewable fossil fuel at date t is S (t). We assume that the stock is
homogeneous. We also assume that the size of the stock is known with certainty and we
abstract from energy storage issues. This stock is depleted at the rate Ef (t), at zero cost,
for simplicity. The evolution of the stock is given by:
S˙ (t) = −Ef (t) ∀ t. (1)
The total amount of productive land available is also finite. We assume a representative
farmer whose behavior summarizes the production decisions of the mass of all farmers. This
representative farmer owns a parcel of arable land of size L. He has to decide how to allocate
his land between the production of food and the production of biofuel. The food production
of the representative farmer is denoted Q (t) while the amount of biofuel he produces is
denoted Eb (t), measured in oil equivalent. At each date t, the fixed amount of arable land
is allocated between food and biofuel, so that:
La (t) + Lb (t) = L, (2)
where La (t) and Lb (t) stand for the amounts of land allocated respectively to food and
biofuel.
We will assume that one unit of oil, or its equivalent in the form of biofuel, generates one
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unit of energy.7 Therefore, the total supply of energy, E (t), will be:
E (t) = Ef (t) + Eb (t) . (3)
Food output is given by
Q (La (t)) = ALa (t) , (4)
while biofuel output is given by
Eb(Lb (t)) = BLb (t) . (5)
The constants A and B are conversion parameters related to the technology in use. Param-
eter B reflects the (linear) conversion efficiency into biofuel of the biomass produced using
one unit of land.8 We assume that the farmers incur increasing marginal cost of produc-
tion. Specifically, producing Q (La (t)) and Eb (Lb (t)) will cost respectively
ca
2
(ALa (t))
2 and
cb
2
(BLb (t))
2, where ca and cb are positive cost parameters. This formulation of the costs is
equivalent to having decreasing returns to scale.9
2.2 The demand sides
The demand for energy at date t is given by the following:
E (t) = N(t) (p¯e − pe (t)) , (6)
where N(t) is the population at date t and pe (t) is the price of energy. The inverse demand
is thus given by
pe (t) = p¯e − E (t)
N(t)
. (7)
We assume that population grows at a constant rate γ ≥ 0 i.e. N(t) = N0eγt. The world
demand for food at date t is given by:
Q (t) = N(t) (p¯a − pa (t)) , (8)
7Of course it should be understood that the biofuel production represents here the net energetic equivalent
of the biomass produced by the farmers. Indeed, in order to produce biofuel, fossil energy is required at
various stages (see Rajagopal and Zilberman 2007, p. 34).
8For example, in the case of sugarcane one hectare of land yields 4900 liters of ethanol (see Rajagopal
and Zilberman 2007, p. 102).
9Andrade de Sa, Palmer and Engel(2010) use a Cobb-Douglas production function that exhibits decreasing
returns to scale in both land and labor inputs.
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where pa (t) is the price of food. The parameters p¯e and p¯a represent the choke prices in the
energy and food markets respectively.
3 The farmers’ problem
In this section, we solve the land allocation problem faced by the representative farmer. In
the energy market, farmers act as a competitive fringe vis-a-vis the oil cartel. The energy
price pe (t) is set by the cartel and this price is taken as given by the representative farmer.
The representative farmer also takes as given the price pa(t) in the food market.
The representative farmer maximizes the sum of his food and biofuel profits subject to
the land constraint (2). In other words, at any date t:
max
La(t), Lb(t)
[
pe(t)BLb(t) + pa(t)ALa(t)− cb
2
(BLb(t))
2 − ca
2
(ALa(t))
2
]
subject to La (t) + Lb (t) = L.
Replacing Lb by L − La, the first-order condition for the determination of La can be
written, assuming an interior solution:
pa(t)A− caA2La(t) = pe(t)B − cbB2[L− La(t)]. (9)
It says that the allocation of land to food production must be such that it equalizes the
marginal net benefit from allocating land to either of its two usages. From (9) we get the
solution for land allocation to food production as a function of the two prices:
La(pa(t), pe(t)) =
pa(t)A− pe(t)B + cbB2L
caA2 + cbB2
. (10)
Therefore, recalling (4), food supply is given by
QS(pa(t), pe(t)) = ALa (pa(t), pe(t)) . (11)
It then follows from (2) that
Lb(pa(t), pe(t)) =
pe(t)B − pa(t)A+ caA2L
caA2 + cbB2
, (12)
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and, from (5), biofuel supply is:
ESb (pa(t), pe(t)) = BLb(pa(t), pe(t)). (13)
We will assume that
cbB
2L > p¯eB − p¯aA > −caA2L. (14)
This guarantees that we have an interior solution, so that positive quantities of land will be
allocated to both food and biofuel. Indeed, the full marginal cost of land allocation to biofuel,
given that it can also be used for food production, is cbB
2Lb(t) + pa(t)A− caA2[L− Lb(t)].
When neither food nor biofuel is produced (Lb = La = 0), this reduces to p¯aA − caA2L
and assumption (14) guarantees that there exists a positive Lb(t) which equates the full
marginal cost to pb(t)B, the marginal revenue from land allocation to biofuel. Similarly, the
full marginal cost of land allocation to agriculture is caA
2La(t)+pb(t)B−cbB2[L−La(t)] and,
by the same reasoning, assumption (14) guarantees that the solution for La(t) is interior.
We will assume that the respective full marginal costs at Lb = La = 0 are both nonnegative:
p¯aA − caA2L ≥ 0 and p¯eB − cbB2L ≥ 0, which of course means p¯a − caAL ≥ 0 and
p¯e − cbBL ≥ 0 since A and B are both positive.
Given the energy price pe(t) set by the cartel, the market clearing condition, obtained by
equating the demand for food (given by (8)) with the supply of food (given by (11)), yields
the food price as a function of this given energy price:
pa(pe(t)) =
θN(t)p¯a − cbAB2L+ ABpe(t)
A2 + θN(t)
. (15)
where
θ = A2ca +B
2cb > 0.
For any land allocation La = Lb = `, θ` is the sum of the marginal costs of production of
food and biofuel.
Thus, because of the competition for the limited amount of land between the production
of food and of biofuel, the price of food is linked to the price of energy. As can be seen from
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(15), at any date t, ceteris paribus the higher the given price of energy, the higher the price
of food.
Using (15), the biofuel supply at any date t can now be rewritten as a function of pe(t)
only:
ESb (pe(t)) = BLb(pa(pe(t)), pe(t)). (16)
There remains to consider the determination of the energy price by the oil cartel.
4 The oil cartel
Subtracting the farmers’ supply of biofuel (16) from the total energy demand (6) gives the
residual demand faced by the oil cartel:
Ef (pe(t)) = N(t) (p¯e − pe(t))−BLb(pa(pe(t)), pe(t)) (17)
Applying equations (12) and (15) in (17), one can derive the inverse residual demand which
can be written as:
Pe (Ef (t)) = β (t)− α(t)Ef (t)
N(t)
, (18)
where
α(t) =
A2 + θN(t)
A2 +B2 + θN(t)
> 0 (19)
β (t) = α(t)
{
p¯e +
AB (p¯a − AL[ca − 1/N(t)])
A2 + θN(t)
}
> 0. (20)
Observe that β(t) can be viewed as the time-varying effective choke price for the residual
demand facing the cartel at each date t. Because of the presence of a fringe of biofuel
producers, β(t) is smaller than p¯e, the choke-price of total demand for energy. The cartel
has to set a price that is lower than β(t) if it wants to sell positive amounts of oil. When
pe(t) ≥ β(t), the total demand for energy is met exclusively by the biofuel producers. As
for α(t), it gives the time-variant slope of the residual inverse demand for oil faced by the
cartel.
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It can be directly established from (19) that α(t) is increasing over time if population
is growing and that lim
t→+∞
α(t) = 1. As for β(t), its time derivative is given by β˙(t) =
(∂β/∂N)N˙(t), where
∂β
∂N
=
B [(A4 + A2B2 + 2θA2N)L+ (Bp¯e − Ap¯a + caA2L)θN2]
(N(t))2 [A2 +B2 + θN(t)]2
. (21)
The right-hand side of (21) is positive, since, from (14), Bp¯e − Ap¯a + caA2L > 0. Therefore
β(t) also increases over time as long as population is growing and lim
t→+∞
β(t) = p¯e. Note that
the residual demand for energy converges asymptotically to the total demand for energy.
We will assume that N0 > N˜ , where N˜ is the positive root of β(0) = 0, so that β(t) > 0
for all t ≥ 0. Since by assumption the marginal cost of oil production is zero, this guarantees
that oil production will be positive from the outset.
Given the inverse residual demand, the oil cartel chooses its oil production path and the
date of exhaustion of its oil stock so as to maximize its discounted flow of profits:
max
Ef (t), T
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
β (t)− α(t)Ef (t)
N(t)
)
Ef (t) dt
subject to:
S˙ (t) = −Ef (t) ,
Ef (t) ≥ 0,
S (0) = S0 and S(T ) ≥ 0 .
The Hamiltonian of the problem is:
H (Ef (t) , λ (t) , t) = e
−rt
(
β (t)− α(t)Ef (t)
N(t)
)
Ef (t) − λ (t)Ef (t)
and the following conditions are necessary for optimality:
β(t)− 2α(t)Ef (t)
N(t)
− ertλ(t) ≤ 0,
(
β(t)− 2α(t)Ef (t)
N(t)
− ertλ(t)
)
Ef (t) = 0 (22)
λ˙ (t) = 0 (23)
S˙ (t) = −Ef (t) (24)
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(
β(T )− α(T )Ef (T )
N(T )
− erTλ(T )
)
Ef (T ) = 0 (25)
λ (T ) ≥ 0 and λ (T )S(T ) = 0. (26)
The Hamiltonian being concave in the control variable Ef (t), linear in λ(t) and independent
of the state variable S(t), conditions (22) to (26) are also sufficient for optimality.
Condition (22) says that, if at any date t extraction is positive, the profit derived from
the marginal barrel of oil must be equal to its current in situ value, ertλ(t).
From (23), we have that λ(t) = λ(0) = λ¯ for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The current shadow value of
in situ oil therefore grows at the rate of interest, so that no profitable arbitrage is possible
with respect to the stock of oil.
The transversality condition (25) states that the value of marginally delaying the terminal
date T , which is given by the Hamiltonian evaluated at T , must be zero. Notice that for
any values of Ef (T ) 6= 0, conditions (22) and (25) cannot both hold at the terminal date T .
Therefore the optimal rate of extraction at T must be zero: Ef (T ) = 0.
The transversality condition (26) states that the value of the remaining stock at the
terminal date T must be zero, either because λ(T ) = λ¯ = 0, or S(T ) = 0, or both. But
λ¯ = 0 would, from (22), contradict the fact that β(T ) > 0. It follows that λ¯ > 0 and
S(T ) = 0: the oil stock will be exhausted. Since the choke price is finite, this will occur in
finite time.
Recalling that N(t) = eγtN0, exhaustion of the stock means that:∫ T
0
β(t)− λ¯ert
2α(t)
eγtdt =
S0
N0
. (27)
This, along with
λ¯ = e−rTβ(T ), (28)
uniquely determines λ¯ and T as functions of the per-capita initial oil stock, S0/N0. For
instance, in the case where population is constant, that is γ = 0, N(t) = N0, and hence
β(t) = β, independent of time, substituting for λ¯ from (28) into (27), we find that T is given
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by:
rT + e−rT =
2αr
β
S0
N0
+ 1. (29)
The solution for λ¯ then follows from (28).
The cartel’s oil extraction path is therefore given by:
Ef (t) =
β(t)− λ¯ert
2α(t)
N(t) ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (30)
where λ¯ and T are the solutions for the shadow price of oil and the date of exhaustion of the
stock in terms of S0/N0.
10 Hence, recalling (18), the evolution of the price of energy over
time will be given by:
pe(t) = β(t)− α(t)
Ef (t)
N(t)
=

β(t) + λ¯ert
2
∀ t ∈ [0, T ]
β(t) ∀ t ∈ [T,∞).
(31)
Since both β(t) and ertλ are increasing functions of time, the price of energy rises con-
tinuously over time. At date T , erT λ¯ = β(T ), so that pe(T ) = β(T ) < p¯e and the stock
of oil is exhausted. From date T on, energy demand is supplied exclusively by the biofuel
producers, with its market price equal to β(t) and tending asymptotically to p¯e, as long as
the population is growing. If the population is constant, then so is β(t) and so will be the
price of energy for all t > T . In all cases however, because the presence of the biofuel fringe
lowers the price leader’s effective choke price, the oil cartel will choose to exhaust its stock
before price reaches p¯e and hence will exhaust its stock of oil sooner than it would in the
absence of the fringe. The switch at T from energy being supplied from both oil and biofuel
to biofuel only results in a downward jump in the rate of change of the price of energy at T
and hence a kink in its time path. This is illustrated in the top graph of Figure 1.
As for the rate of oil extraction by the cartel, although it must eventually be decreasing
to reach zero at T , it cannot be ruled out that it be increasing at the beginning, as illustrated
in the bottom graph of Figure 1. Differentiating (31) with respect to time, we find that:
E˙f (t) =
(β˙(t)− rertλ¯)N(t) + (β(t)− ertλ¯)N˙(t)
2α(t)
− (β(t)− e
rtλ¯)N(t)α˙(t)
2α(t)2
. (32)
10The result of exhaustion in finite time is robust even to a change in the oil industry structure: the only
difference being that the cartel is more conservationist than a fully competitive oil industry.
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λλe rt
tT
tT
0
0
2α
Pe
Pe
β0
(β0+λ)/2
Ef
(β0+λ)N0
β(t)
Pe(t)
Figure 1: Optimal energy pricing and oil extraction by the cartel
Since the second term is positive, for Ef (t) to be increasing the first term must also be
positive. Therefore, in order for oil production to be increasing over some initial interval of
time, it is necessary, though not sufficient, that:
(
β˙(0)− rλ¯
)
N0 +
(
β(0)− λ¯) γN0 > 0. (33)
In the particular case of a constant population (γ = 0), we have β˙(t) = 0 for all t and
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the necessary condition (33) cannot be satisfied. Therefore, if the population is constant,
the production of energy from fossil fuel will be at its maximum at t = 0 and will decrease
from thereon until it reaches zero at t = T . By continuity, the same will be true for some
small values of γ.
As for the equilibrium price path of food, substituting for pe(t) from (31) into (15), it
can be written:
pa(t) =

θp¯aN(t) + (AB/2)(β(t) + λ¯e
rt)− AB2Lcb
A2 + θN(t)
∀t ∈ [0, T ]
θp¯aN(t) + (AB/2)β(t)− AB2Lcb
A2 + θN(t)
∀t ∈ [T,∞).
Differentiating with respect to time, its evolution over time can be written:
p˙a(t) =

[
∂pa
∂N
+
1
2
∂pa
∂pe
∂β
∂N
]
N˙(t) +
1
2
rλ¯ert
∂pa
∂pe
∀t ∈ [0, T ]
[
∂pa
∂N
+
1
2
∂pa
∂pe
∂β
∂N
]
N˙(t) ∀t ∈ [T,∞).
(34)
As already pointed out, ∂pa/∂pe is positive, from (15). Therefore the second term in the
top expression is positive. Also, as established from (21), ∂β/∂N is positive. As for ∂pa/∂N ,
it is given by:
∂pa
∂N
=
θ[(θ{N(t)− 1})p¯a + A2p¯a − ABpe(t) + cbAB2L]
[A2 + θN(t)]2
≥ θA[Ap¯a −Bp¯e + cbB
2L]
[A2 + θN(t)]2
> 0 (by assumption (14)).
Therefore the price of food is continuously increasing if the population is growing, as il-
lustrated in Figure 2. It will grow at a faster rate for t < T , while the oil stock is being
depleted, than for t > T , when the only source of supply of energy is biofuel, with a kink in
the path occurring at T . If population is constant, it will grow until T and become constant
afterwards.
For all t > T , the farmers will be the sole suppliers of both the food and the energy
market. The equilibrium prices can then be determined using the solution to the farmers’
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Figure 2: The food price path
land allocation problem of Section 3 and the market clearing conditions. We will have pa(t) =
pa(pe(t)) given by (15), but with pe(t) = β(t). The price of food will tend asymptotically to
p¯a, while the price of energy tends asymptotically to p¯e. In the case of a constant population,
both of those prices would be constant beyond T , both smaller than their respective choke
price.
5 The effects of land productivity on equilibrium prices
It is interesting now to look at the effect on the price paths of energy and food of improving
the land use in either biofuel and food production by changing the productivity parameters
B and A. As will become clear, the effect will remain ambiguous, for two reasons: because
of the fixed stock of oil available and because of the interaction between the two markets due
the sharing of the fixed land area available. We will assume for this purpose that population
is constant and will normalize by setting N = 1. N being constant, so will α and β.
Consider first the effect on the equilibrium price of energy, pe. From (29) we verify that:
∂T
∂x
=
∂T
∂ (α/β)
∂ (α/β)
∂x
=
2S0
1− e−rT
α
β
[ξαx − ξβx]
x
, x = A,B (35)
15
where
ξzx =
∂z
∂x
x
z
, z = α, β
denote the responsiveness (elasticities) of the endogenous choke price and slope of the residual
demand curve faced by the oil cartel. Whether a change in the parameters A or B will result
in an increase or decrease in the date of exhaustion of the oil stock will depend crucially on
those responsiveness, as can be seen from (35).
Differentiating (19) with respect to A and B it is easily established that ∂α/∂A > 0 and
∂α/∂B < 0, so that ξαA > 0 and ξαB < 0. Therefore, if increasing A were to leave the
choke price β unchanged or reduce it (ξβA ≤ 0), thus resulting in a new residual demand for
oil which lies everywhere below the old one,11 the effect would be to delay the exhaustion
of the oil stock. Similarly, if increasing B were to leave the choke price β unchanged or
increase it (ξβB ≥ 0), thus resulting in new residual demand for oil which lies everywhere
above the old one, the effect would be to accelerate the exhaustion of the oil stock. In such
cases, the new time path of pe will necessarily cross the old one, since having the new path
either everywhere below or everywhere above the old one would be inconsistent with the
given initial stock of oil. In the case of an increase in A with ξβB ≥ 0, the new path will
cut the old one from above at some date τ < T , so that for t < τ the price of energy will
have increased while for t > τ it will have decreased. In the case of an increase in B with
ξβB ≥ 0, the new path will cut the old one from below at some date τ < T , with the result
that pe will have decreased for all t < τ and increased thereafter.
12
As shown in the Appendix, the signs of ξβA and of ξβB are in fact indeterminate. If
ξβA > 0 and sufficiently large to have ξαA − ξβA < 0, then the effect of an increase in A will
be to exhaust the oil stock earlier. The new residual demand faced by the cartel then lies
11The residual demand will then lie everywhere below the old one since both β and β/α are then reduced,
β/α being the level of demand of oil that corresponds to pe = 0. Notice that ξ(β/α)x = ξβx− ξαx = −ξ(α/β)x.
12In this last case, measures aimed at improving the productivity of land in biofuel production actually
result in an acceleration in the use of oil, a phenomenon which might be viewed as a form the “Green Para-
dox”, a phenomenon first emphasized by Sinn (2008) and subsequently analyzed by Grafton, Kompas and
Long (2010), Ploeg and Withagen (2010) and Smulders, Tsur and Zemel (2010), among others. Chakravorty
et al. (2010) also note this phenomenon in their analysis of the long-run effect of biofuel mandates on food
prices.
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everywhere above the old one. Similarly, if ξβB < 0 with ξαB − ξβB > 0, then an increase
in B will retard the date of exhaustion of the oil stock, the oil cartel’s new residual demand
lying everywhere below the old one. In both of those cases, the new time path of the price
of energy will again necessarily cut the old one, from below in the first case and from above
in the second case. Thus, in the first case, an increase in A now results in a lower pe up to
some date τ at which the old and the new price paths cross, and a higher pe thereafter. In
the second case, the reverse is true for an increase in B.
There remains the possibility that ξβA > 0 but still ξαA−ξβA > 0, with the result that the
new residual demand faced by the oil producer will necessarily cut the old one from above
at some positive price level. In this case, and only in this case, it becomes possible for the
new price path of energy to be everywhere above the old one subsequent to an increase in A.
Similarly, it is possible to have ξβB < 0 with ξαB− ξβB < 0, so that the new residual demand
curve cuts the old one from below at some positive price level, in which case an increase in
B may leave the new price path of energy everywhere below the old one.
That the price paths may cross subsequent to improvements in land use in either food
or biofuel production is due to the fact that the available oil stock is fixed. That it is not
possible to predict analytically whether the new price path will cut the old one from below
or from above, or maybe not at all, is due to the interaction between the market for food and
the market for energy, which partly share the fixed availability of agricultural land. Hence
there is no definite analytical answer as to the effect on the price of energy. In fact, as shown
in the Appendix, the effects of A and B on the equilibrium price of energy at any date t are
given by:
∂pe
∂A
=
∂pe
∂A
∣∣∣∣
Ef≡0
−
(
2A(ca + 1)
A2 +B2 + θ
)
Ef −
(
AB
A2 +B2 + θ
)
∂Ef
∂A
(36)
∂pe
∂B
=
∂pe
∂B
∣∣∣∣
Ef≡0
−
(
2B
A2 +B2 + θ
)
Ef −
(
A2 + θ
A2 +B2 + θ
)
∂Ef
∂B
, (37)
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where
∂pe
∂A
∣∣∣∣
Ef≡0
=
Bp¯a + 2A(ca + 1)[p¯e − pe −BL]
A2 +B2 + θ
(38)
∂pe
∂B
∣∣∣∣
Ef≡0
=
Ap¯a + 2B(cb + 1)[p¯e − pe]− 2Bpe − A2L(ca + 1)
A2 +B2 + θ
(39)
are the effects on the equilibrium price of energy when energy supply depends entirely on
biofuel production. The price pe is the equilibrium price (see Appendix) and Ef is given by
(30) with λ¯ given by (28) and T by (29).13
For t > T the oil stock is completely depleted and biofuel becomes the only source of
energy. Hence the effects of A and B on the price of energy are reduced to (38) and (39).
Clearly p¯e − pe > 0, while p¯e − pe − BL < 0 since in equilibrium p¯e − pe − BLb − Ef = 0,
so that p¯e − pe − BL = −BLa < 0 when Ef = 0, as in the static equilibrium that occurs
for t > T . Hence, even in a static framework where all energy is obtained from biofuel,
the direction of the effects on the price of energy of improving the productivity of land in
either food or biofuel production is ambiguous, being crucially dependent on the value of the
parameters. This is due to the complex interaction between the food and the energy markets
that results from their sharing of the available land. When we add to this ambiguity the
fact that for t < T the new and the old price paths of energy can cross, it is to be expected
that the directions of those effects cannot be uniquely determined analytically.
Not surprisingly, much the same ambiguity will hold for the price of food as does for the
price of energy, and for the similar reasons. The effects of the parameters A and B on the
equilibrium price of food at any date t are given (see Appendix) by:
∂pa
∂A
=
∂pa
∂A
∣∣∣∣
Ef≡0
−
(
B
A2 +B2 + θ
)
Ef −
(
AB
A2 +B2 + θ
)
∂Ef
∂A
(40)
∂pa
∂B
=
∂pa
∂B
∣∣∣∣
Ef≡0
−
(
A
A2 +B2 + θ
)
Ef −
(
AB
A2 +B2 + θ
)
∂Ef
∂B
, (41)
13Recall that since N(t) is constant and normalized to one, α and β are independent of time.
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where
∂pa
∂A
∣∣∣∣
Ef≡0
=
Bp¯e + 2A(ca + 1)(p¯a − pa)− 2Ap¯a −B2(cb + 1)L
A2 +B2 + θ
(42)
∂pa
∂B
∣∣∣∣
Ef≡0
=
Ap¯e + 2B(cb + 1)[p¯− pa − AL]
A2 +B2 + θ
(43)
with the price pa being the equilibrium price (see Appendix) and Ef being given by (30)
with λ¯ given by (28) and T by (29).
Again, even when the supply of energy depends entirely on biofuel production, as is the
case for t > T , the effects of improving the productivity of land use in either food or biofuel
production are ambiguous, because of the common land constraint faced by food and biofuel
production which indirectly links those two otherwise independent markets. Indeed, p¯a− pa
being positive and p¯ − pa − AL being negative, the signs of both (42) and (43) depend on
value of the parameters. An analytical determination of the directions of those effects for
all t is made all the more difficult by the fact that the price path of energy for t < T can
respond in various ways, depending again on the values of the parameters.
6 Concluding remarks
The object of this paper has been the study of the effects on the food sector of the recent
development of biofuels as a substitute for fossil fuel in the supply of energy. We have shown
how competition for the finite land resource, which takes place between biofuel and food
production, explicitly defines a relationship between the energy price and the food price.
The rate of depletion of the oil stock may at first increase if population is growing, but
it will eventually decrease to zero as the stock gets exhausted. The price of energy will
however increase continuously while the stock of oil is being depleted, due to the decline of
the remaining per capita stock of oil, and this whether population is growing or constant. If
population is growing, it will keep increasing after biofuel becomes the only source of energy.
As for the food price, it is also increasing. Two effects account for this growth in the
price of food. Firstly, the increase in the energy price raises the opportunity cost of the
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use of land for food production, creating an incentive for farmers to reallocate their land
in favor of biofuel production. Secondly, population growth increases the demand for food,
thus pushing upwards the equilibrium price in the food market.
Although the effect on the price path of food of introducing competition for land between
food and biofuel productions is clear, it is not so clear whether investing in productivity
enhancing measures in the agricultural food sector, as advocated by the UN secretary general
during the 2008 food summit, would alleviate the effect of biofuel production on food prices.
What the effect of such productivity measures might be turns out to depend in a complex
manner on the various parameters involved in the competition for land between the food and
biofuel sectors and in the competition on the energy market between the biofuel and fossil
fuel sectors: it may or may not alleviate the pressure on food prices, as it may alleviate it in
the short term but not in the long term, or vice-versa. Hence the matter remains an entirely
empirical one, but an empirical one which certainly deserves further investigation given its
importance for the so-called “food security” issue.
Others might want to emphasize the “energy security” issue and hence focus on improve-
ments in land use in the biofuel sector as a means of generating lower energy prices. Again,
for much the same reasons, the effects of such measures on the price of energy, or for that
matter on the price of food, are unclear from a purely analytical stand point and would need
careful empirical investigation to determine the likely effects of implementing such measures.
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Appendix
A The effects of varying A and B on α and β
Assuming N constant and normalized to one, and differentiating (19), we find that:
∂α
∂A
=
2AB2(ca + 1)
A2 +B2 + θ
> 0
and
∂α
∂B
= −2A
2B(ca + 1)
A2 +B2 + θ
< 0.
Differentiating (20) with respect to A, we get:
∂β
∂A
=
β
α
∂α
∂A
+ α
B
?︷ ︸︸ ︷
{p¯a − 2AL[ca − 1]}−2A(ca + 1)
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
β
α
− p¯e
)
A2 + θ
=
β
α
∂α
∂A
+ α
∂(β/α)
∂A
.
The sign of the second term being indeterminate, so is the sign ∂β/∂A.
Similarly, differentiating (20) with respect to B, we get:
∂β
∂B
=
β
α
∂α
∂B
+ α
A
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
{p¯a − AL[ca − 1]}−2Bcb
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
β
α
− p¯e
)
A2 + θ
=
β
α
∂α
∂B
+ α
∂(β/α)
∂B
.
Again, the sign of the second term is indeterminate and hence so is that of ∂β/∂B. The
expression p¯a−AL[ca−1] is positive, since p¯a−ALca is positive by assumption (see page 8).
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B The effects of varying A and B on the equilibrium prices
Assuming N constant and normalized to one, the equilibrium (pa, pe, La, Lb, Ef , T ) is the
solution to the following system of six equations:
From (9): Apa −Bpe − [A2ca +B2cb]La +B2cbL = 0 (44)
From (2): La + Lb = L (45)
From (4) and (8): p¯a − pa − ALa = 0 (46)
From (3), (5) and (6): p¯e − pe −BLb =
{
Ef for t ≤ T
0 for t > T
(47)
From (30) and (28): Ef =

(
β
α
)(
1− e−r(T−t)
2
)
for t ≤ T
0 for t > T
(48)
From (29): rT + e−rT =
(
α
β
)
2rS0 + 1 (49)
Using equations (45) and (46) to eliminate La and Lb, we find that (44) and (47) become:
(A2 + θ)pa − ABpe = θp¯a − AB2cbL
Bpa + Ape = Bp¯a + A[p¯e −BL− Ef ].
Upon solving for (pa, pe), we get:
pa =
(B2 + θ)p¯a + ABp¯e − AB2L(ca + 1)
A2 +B2 + θ
− AB
A2 +B2 + θ
Ef
pe =
(A2 + θ)p¯e + ABp¯a − A2BL(ca + 1)
A2 +B2 + θ
− A
2 + θ
A2 +B2 + θ
Ef ,
where Ef and T are to be determined from equations (48) and (49). In both of those
equations the first term represents the equilibrium price when all energy is supplied from
biofuel, which is the case for t > T , the oil stock being then fully depleted. Those first terms
can be usefully denoted respectively pa|Ef≡0 and pe|Ef≡0.
Differentiating the above two equilibrium prices with respect to A and B then yields
(36), (37), (40) and (41).
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